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Abstract 
The paper uses New Empirical Industrial Organization approach, especially 
Panzar-Rosse model to estimates the level of competition of the banking industry in the 
Czech Republic during the period 2001–2009. We apply Panzar-Rosse model to 
estimate H statistic for a panel of 15 banks, which represent almost 90 % of the market. 
This paper also measures and compares the degree of banking competition in two sub-
periods, 2001–2005 and 2005–2009, in order to investigate development of the 
competitive structure of the Czech banking industry. We found that the market was in 
equilibrium during most of the estimation period, which is a necessary condition for 
sound evaluation of the competition level. While the market can be described as 
perfectly competitive in 2001–2005, the intensity of competition decreased after joining 
the EU in 2004 and the market can be characterized as one of monopolistic competition 
in 2005–2009. The monopolistic competition in the Czech banking market was also 
revealed if the full sample 2001–2009 is considered. 
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The literature on the measurement of competition can be divided into two major 
streams: structural and non-structural approaches. The structural approach to the 
measurement of competition embraces the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
(SCP) and the efficiency hypothesis. The two former models investigate whether 
a highly concentrated market causes collusive behavior among the larger banks 
resulting in superior market performance, and whether it is the efficiency of larger 
banks that enhances their performance. These structural models link competition to 
concentration. Non-structural models for the measurement of competition, namely the 
Iwata model (Iwata, 1974), the Bresnahan model (Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982)), 
and the Panzar-Rosse (P-R) model (Panzar and Rosse, 1987), were developed in 
reaction to the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the structural models. These 
New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approaches test competition and the use 
of market power, and stress the analysis of banks‟ competitive conduct in the absence of 
structural measures (Bikker and Haaf, 2000, p. 17).  
While tests of market power carried out employing the traditional SCP approach, 
observe the structure of the market (e.g. concentration levels, number of firms) and 
relate this to the conduct (e.g. pricing policies) and performance (e.g. ROA, ROE) of 
firms; in nonstructural approaches empirical studies do not observe the competitive 
environment but they attempt to measure/infer it. Probably the most important 
advantage of non-structural approaches is that it cannot be assumed a priori that 
concentrated markets are not competitive because contestability may depend on the 
extent of potential competition and not necessarily on market structure. Another 
advantage of non-structural models is that there is no need to specify a geographic 
market, since the behavior of individual banks gives an indication of their market 
power. Non-structural measures of competition are mainly based on the Lerner (1934) 
measure of monopoly power (Casu and Girardone, 2006, p. 3–4). 
The Panzar and Rosse model has proven to be a useful tool for observing 
competition. This model is based on the comparative static properties of the 
reduced-form bank revenue equation. The Panzar-Rosse model uses data for individual 
banks, which tend to be available in sample quantities, allowing fairly precise 
estimations of competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). A disadvantage of the P-R 
approach is its assumption that banks provide one banking product only. It does not 
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allow us to distinguish between different products or geographical markets, which by 
the way would also be hampered by a lack of required data, e.g. bank-level interest rates 
and production figures. 
The aim of the paper is to examine the degree of competition within the Czech 
Republic banking industry during the period 2001–2009. The Czech Republic‟s 
financial system is traditionally bank-based and banks play an important role in the 
economy on the side of corporations and business as well as households. Furthermore, 
the banking sector in the Czech Republic went through serious crisis in late 1990s 
followed by a period of consolidation that included, among others, failures of small 
banks, privatization of large state-owned banks combined with their recapitalization and 
cleaning their loan portfolios. The Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004 
and the banking sector cannot stand apart from the ongoing process of financial 
integration within the European Union. Therefore, the analysis of competition in 
industry with so many important development milestones is of high interest. 
 
Concentration of the banking sector 
 
Concentration ratio (CR) shows the degree to which an industry is dominated by 
a small number of large firms or made up of many small banks. Higher CR reflects 
a more concentrated market. Summing over the market shares of the k largest banks in 
the market, it takes the form: 
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Bikker and Haaf (2000) defined Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as the sum 
of the squares of the bank sizes measured as market shares. The HHI index ranges 
between 
 
 
 and 1, reaching its lowest value, the reciprocal of the number of banks, when 
all banks in a market are of equal size, and reaching unity in the case of monopoly (in 
a market with only one bank). HHI takes the form: 
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where n is the number of banks in the banking sector, 
 qk is the volume of the output of bank k, k = 1, 2,…,n, 
 Q is the volume of the output of the banking sector, 
 rk is the share of the output of the bank k to the output of the banking sector.  
 
Tab. I illustrates the structural characteristics of the Czech„s banking sector from 
2001 to 2009. The common measures of concentration, which are the concentration 
ratio and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), are calculated. It is used the three largest 
bank concentration ratio (CR3), the five largest bank concentration ratio (CR5) and the 
ten largest bank concentration ratio (CR10), which defined as the ratio of the total assets 
of the three, five and ten largest banks to the total assets of all the banks in a given year. 
 
I: Concentration of the Czech banking sector 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CR3 58.77 57.18 56.88 54.35 55.63 54.32 54.68 50.63 51.22 
CR5 68.38 65.75 65.77 63.97 65.49 64.15 65.70 62.02 62.41 
CR10 80.60 79.78 79.38 77.96 79.31 77.63 79.87 78.34 79.08 
HHI 0.130 0.120 0.117 0.110 0.115 0.110 0.114 0.101 0.103 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In general, CR and HHI show a trend of modest decrease, meaning that market 
concentration changed appreciably over the sample period. The Czech banking market 
could be described as a moderately concentrated market over the period of 2001–2009. 
 
Literature review 
 
Gelos and Roldós (2004), Yildirim and Philippatos (2003), Claessens and 
Laeven (2004), Drakos and Konstantinou (2005) and Pawlowska (2005) found the 
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monopolistic competition using the Panzar-Rosse model in the Czech banking sector 
during the 1990s. Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006) indicated the 
monopolistic competition in the Czech banking industry in 1998–2002. Bikker et al. 
(2007) found that competition is substantially lower in countries with socialist legal 
history, such as Eastern Europe, where large banks are less competitive than other 
countries. For the Czech Republic they identified the monopolistic competition using 
Panzar-Rosse model in 1995–2004. Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) determined by 
Panzar-Rosse approach the monopolistic competition in the Czech Republic in 1999–
2004. Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) showed in the Czech credit market growth in the 
absence of competition by Lerner index during the privatization period (1999–2002). 
This is surprising, because with the growth of the entry of foreign investors in the 
banking sector should increase its competitiveness. In 2002–2005 they recorded 
a decline of competition, which was caused by offering relatively riskier and more 
expensive products after 2002. Bikker et al. (2009) identified the Czech banking sector 
as a monopolistic competition in the period 1986–2004. 
 
Panzar-Rosse Model 
 
The method developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) determines the competitive 
behavior of banks on the basis of the comparative static properties of reduced-form 
revenue equations based on cross-section data. Panzar and Rosse show that if their 
method is to yield plausible results, banks need to have operated in a long-term 
equilibrium, while the performance of banks needs to be influenced by the actions of 
other market participants. The model assumes a price elasticity of demand, e, greater 
than unity, and a homogeneous cost structure. To obtain the equilibrium output and the 
equilibrium number of banks, profits are maximized at the bank as well as the industry 
level. That means, first, that bank i maximizes its profits where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost: 
 
    0,,´,,´  iiiiiii twxCznxR ,       (1) 
 
where  Ri is the total revenue, 
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 Ci is the total expenses, 
xi is the output of bank i,  
n is the number of banks,  
wi is a vector of m factor input prices of bank i, 
zi is a vector of exogenous variables that shift the bank„s revenue function, 
ti is a vector of exogenous variables that shift the bank„s cost function. 
 
In equilibrium, the zero profit constraint holds at the market level: 
 
    0,,,, *****  twxCznxR ii .       (2) 
 
Variables marked with * represent equilibrium values. Market power is 
measured by the extent to which a change in factor input prices  
1k
w  is reflected in the 
equilibrium revenues  *iR  earned by bank i. Panzar and Rosse define a measure of 
competition, the H statistic as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced form revenues 
with respect to factor prices: 
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The estimated value of the H statistic ranges between -∞<H≤1. In particular, the 
H statistic is non-positive if the market structure is a monopoly, a perfectly colluding 
oligopoly, or a conjectural-variation, short-run oligopoly. In such a case, an increase in 
input prices will increase marginal cost of the bank and reduce equilibrium output as 
well as total revenue accordingly. The monopoly analysis includes the case of price-
taking competitive firms, as long as the prices they face are truly exogenous, that is, as 
long as their equilibrium values are unaffected by changes in the other exogenous 
variables in the model. An empirical refutation of „monopoly‟ constitutes a rejection of 
the assumption that the revenues of the banks in question are independent of the 
decisions made by their actual or potential rivals. Panzar and Rosse prove that under 
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monopoly, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium 
output and subsequently reduce revenues; hence H will be zero or negative. 
If H lies between zero and unity, the market structure is characterized by 
monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic competition, total revenues increase less 
than proportionately to changes in input prices, since the demand facing individual 
banks is inelastic. Assuming some sort of product differentiation between the outputs of 
the different banks, the profit maximizing firms are confronted with a falling aggregate 
demand curve and behave like monopolists, which results in equalizing marginal costs 
and marginal revenues in the equilibrium state. By market exit and entry of imperfect 
substitutes, the demand curve always shifts in a way that the monopolist just earns zero 
profits (Panzar and Rosse, 1987, p. 448–451). 
The H statistic is unity if the market structure is characterized as perfect 
competition. Under this condition, any increase in input prices will increase both 
marginal and average costs without changing the equilibrium output of any individual 
bank. This is true since those institutions that cannot cover the increase in input prices 
through increased revenue will be forced to exit the market. The exit of some banks 
increasing the demand for the remaining ones and a simultaneous increase of output 
prices. As a result, industry revenues raise equivalent to the rise in costs. The H statistic 
is also equal to one for a natural monopoly operating in a perfectly contestable market 
and a sales-maximizing bank subject to break-even constraints. Tab. II summarizes the 
discriminatory power of H. 
 
II: Panzar-Rosse H statistic 
H ≤ 0 Monopoly equilibrium or perfect cartel 
0 < H < 1 Monopolistic competition  
H = 1 Perfect competition  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
An important feature of the H statistic is that it must be performed on 
observations that are in long-run equilibrium, as suggested in previous studies such as 
Bikker and Haaf (2002), Claessens and Laeven (2004), Casu and Girardone (2006), 
Matthews et al. (2007), Fu (2009) and Rezitis (2010). This suggests that competitive 
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capital markets will equalize risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such that, in 
equilibrium, rates of return should be uncorrelated with input prices (Matthews et al., 
2007, p. 2030). The equilibrium test is carried out with the return on assets (or equity), 
replacing bank revenue as the dependent variable in the regression equation for the 
H statistic. The E statistic is derived from the equilibrium test and measures the sum of 
elasticities of rate of return with respect to input prices (Fu, 2009). If the E statistic is 
equal to zero, it indicates long-run equilibrium, while E < 0 reflects disequilibrium. 
Tab. III summarizes the discriminatory power of E statistic. 
 
III: Equilibrium test 
E = 0 Equilibrium 
E < 0 Disequilibrium 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Methodology and Data 
 
Several specifications of the Panzar-Rosse model have been used in empirical 
literature. One of the crucial differences among studies is the definition of the dependent 
variable applied in the estimation of H statistic. Chan et al. (2007), Pawlowska (2005), 
Deltuvaitė (2007) or Lee and Nagano (2008) use interest income (revenues). 
Alternatively, Hempell (2002), Bikker et al. (2009) or Rezitis (2010) apply a total 
income or net income (de Rozas, 2007). Some authors analyze the competition in 
banking using a combination of more than one equation. For example, Chun and Kim 
(2004) or Fu (2009) have total revenues and interest revenues as dependent variables.  
The dependent variable in Eq. (4) chosen for the present paper is defines total revenue 
to total assets, rather than only the interest part, in order to account for the fact that the 
importance of non-interest income has increased greatly in recent years in the Czech 
Republic‟s banking sector. This view is supported, among others, by Casu and 
Girardone (2006), Pererera et al. (2006) and Rezitis (2010), who argue that in a more 
competitive environment, the distinction between interest and non-interest income 
becomes less relevant, as banks are competing on both forms. The existence of 
accounting differences across countries is an additional argument in favor of having 
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a comprehensive view of bank revenues. And the dependent variable is divided by total 
assets in order to account for size differences as suggested by Casu and Girardone 
(2006). 
 
,lnln
lnlnlnlnln
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where  TREVit is ratio of total revenue to total assets, 
PLit is ratio of personnel expenses to number of employees,  
PKit is ratio of other expenses to fixed assets, 
PFit is ratio of annual interest expenses to total loanable funds (deposits + 
tradable securities + subordinated instruments). 
Bank-specific and market-specific variables include: 
ASSETit is sum of total assets, 
BRit is he ratio of the number of branches of a bank to the total number of 
branches of all banks, 
RISKASSit is the ratio of provisions to total assets, 
i denotes the bank (i = 1, …, N), t denotes time (t = 1, …, T). 
 
PLit, PKit and PFit correspond to the three input prices, i.e., labor, capital and 
funds. Consistently with the intermediation approach, we assume that banks use all the 
three inputs. Other explanatory variables are chosen to account for bank-specific and 
market-specific factors. Bank-specific factors are additional explanatory variables 
which reflect differences in risks, costs, size and structures of banks and should, at least 
theoretically, stem from the marginal revenue and cost functions underlying the 
empirical Panzar-Rosse Eq. (4). Similar variables are used also in Chun and Kim 
(2004), Matthews et al. (2007), Fu (2009) or Rezitis (2010).  
The total asset variable (ASSETit) is included to take account of possible scale 
economies. The ratio of the number of branches of each bank to the total number of 
branches of the whole banking industry variable (BRit) is used in order to account for 
bank size. Branching has been viewed as a means for maintaining market share by 
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providing consumers with close-quarter access to financial services, mitigating to some 
extent price competition.  
The provisions to total assets variable (RISKASSit) is a measure of the riskiness 
of the bank‟s overall portfolio. It is used to account for firm specific risk and it is 
expected to be positively correlated to the dependent variables, since higher provisions 
should lead to higher bank revenues. An increase in provisions is a diversion of capital 
from earnings, which could have a negative effect on revenue. In contrast, a higher level 
of provisions indicates a more risky loan portfolio and therefore a higher level of 
compensating return. 
 
The model assumes a one-way error component as described by 
 
,itiit             (5) 
 
where i  denotes the unobservable bank-specific effect and it  denotes a random term 
which is assumed to be IID. The H statistic is given by  
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For obtaining equilibrium conditions the model is defined as follows:  
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,itiitu             (8) 
 
where ROA is the return on assets ratio,    is the bank-specific effect and     is an IID 
random error. The banking market is deemed to be in equilibrium if  
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The dataset used in the analysis covers all major Czech banks of the period 
2001–2009 and has been collected from the annual bank reports and BankScope 
database. Over the sample period, the sample banks controlled on average about 87 % 
of the Czech banking market with the remaining share controlled by branches of foreign 
banks in the Czech Republic and “special” credit institutions (building societies, State 
banks of special purpose, and others). The dataset consists of 15 banks over 9 years. 
Due to some missing observations we have an unbalanced panel of 127 bank-year 
observations. To allow for heterogeneity across the banks, we use an error-component 
model, with the bank-specific error components estimated as fixed effects. Descriptive 
statistics is presented in Tab. IV. 
 
IV: Descriptive statistics 
  TREV PL PK PF ASSET BR RISKASS ROA 
Mean 
0.065 0.779 2.615 0.024 167831 0.070 0.005 0.011 
Median 
0.058 0.691 1.448 0.020 52410 0.015 0.002 0.010 
Maximum 
0.261 2.262 13.44 0.111 788177 0.449 0.036 0.076 
Minimum 
0.029 0.326 0.326 0.002 930.7 0.000 0.000 -0.027 
Std. Dev. 
0.030 0.302 2.389 0.017 221495 0.106 0.007 0.012 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from BankScope 
 
Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
The empirical analysis begins with a test for market equilibrium. Since the 
Czech Republic‟s banking sector went through dynamic development during the period 
of estimation it would be very ambitious to test only for equilibrium over the full 
sample. Instead, we run regressions of two 5-year sub-periods with 2005 as an overlap 
and also a rolling regression of a 4-year window in order to reveal periods of market 
disequilibrium. Tab. V reports the results of estimation of Eq. (7). To conserve the 
space only elasticities required to the equilibrium test (Eq. 9) are presented. 
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The results suggest that market was in equilibrium over the whole estimation 
period and in most of the sub-periods. Only in one sub-period the market is in 
disequilibrium. As argued in Matthews et al. (2007) the restriction that E=0 (market 
equilibrium) is necessary for the perfect competition case but not for the monopolistic 
competition case. 
 
V: Equilibrium tests (rolling sample) dependent variable lnROA 
 lnPL lnPK lnPF Sum H0: E=0 Eq./Diseq. 
2001-2009 0.0205 -0.0065 -0.0030 0.0108 F (1, 106) = 2.460
 
Equil. 
2001-2005 0.0400 -0.0165 -0.0024 0.0210 F (1, 53) = 1.7977 Equil. 
2005-2009 0.0008 -0.0030 0.0003 -0.0018 F (1, 47) = 0.0616 Equil. 
2001-2004 0.0515 -0.0222 -0.0036 0.0256 F (1, 38) = 1.6696 Equil. 
2002-2005 0.0229 -0.0237 -0.0065 -0.0073 F (1, 39) = 0.1367
 
Equil. 
2003-2006 0.0089 -0.0200 -0.0111 -0.0222 F (1, 39) = 5.4080
b 
Diseq. 
2004-2007 0.0042 -0.0055 -0.0065 -0.0078 F (1, 38) = 1.1599 Equil. 
2005-2008 -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0051 F (1, 35) = 0.5427 Equil. 
2006-2009 0.0001 -0.0042 0.0015 -0.0026 F (1, 32) = 0.0686 Equil. 
b
 denotes significance at 5% level 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Next, we can proceed with estimation of Eq. (4) and calculation of the H statistic 
as in Eq. (6). Regarding competitive condition tests, based on the market concentration 
measures CR shown in Tab. I, it is expected that the H statistic for testing the 
competitive positions in the Czech banking sector will vary between zero and unity. 
This would imply that banks in the Czech Republic operated under conditions of 
monopolistic competition during the sample period. 
The results presented in Tab. VI show that all explanatory variables have 
consistent coefficients as far as the sign is concerned. However, the magnitude and 
significance vary considerably across the periods. Negative and significant coefficients 
of total assets document that the bank size has a negative effect on total revenues and, 
thus, indicate negative economies of scale in the Czech Republic‟s banking sector. Price 
of funds was significant over the full sample and in the first sub-period (before joining 
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the EU) demonstrating an ability of banks to offset more expensive funds by higher 
revenues. Number of branches seems to be significant determinant of total revenues in 
the second sub-period and in full sample. The positive coefficient suggests that positive 
effects of maintaining a proximity to customers dominate the increased cost of higher 
branch network. Such a result confirms a return of customers‟ preferences to standard 
face-to-face banking in brick-and-mortar branches. Although the riskiness of bank‟s 
portfolio is not significant in any of the sub-periods, a significantly positive impact on 
total revenues was found for the whole estimation period. One can see this as 
a confirmation of the mutual relation between taken risk and generated revenues. 
  
VI: Test of competitive conditions dependent variable lnTREV 
Variable 2001–2009 2001–2005 2005–2009 
Intercept 2.9433
a
 (3.6089) 5.2043
a
 (2.7842) 1.5158 (1.1045) 
lnPL 0.5160
a
 (3.8066) 0.7732
b
 (2.4656) 0.6534
a
 (4.1669) 
lnPK -0.0690 (-1.1030) -0.0089 (-0.0701) -0.0472 (-0.7315) 
lnPF 0.1770
a
 (4.3685) 0.2203
a
 (2.9090) 0.0306 (0.5351) 
lnASSET -0.3908
a
 (-6.3112) -0.6010
a
 (-3.4153) -0.3102
a
 (-3.1877) 
lnBR 0.0965
b
 (2.5849) 0.0467 (0.5948) 0.1298
b 
(2.0669) 
lnRISKASS 0.0213
b
 (2.2985) 0.0177 (1.1908) 0.0090
 
(0.7217) 
    
H0:   =0 F (14, 106) = 14.0967
a
 F (14, 53) = 6.4132
a
 F (14, 47) = 13.2803
a
 
H0: H=0 F (1, 106) = 15.7543
a
 F (1, 53) = 7.0866
b
 F (1, 47) = 16.9483
a
 
H1: H=1 F (1, 106) = 5.7187
b 
F (1, 53) = 0.0017 F (1, 47) = 5.5111
b
 
H 0.6240 0.9846 0.6368 
a, b, c
 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, t-values in parentheses 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The null hypothesis that the bank fixed effects are jointly zero (H0:    = 0) is 
rejected at the 1% significance level for the full sample, for the first sub-sample as well 
as for the second sub-sample. This indicates the usefulness of the fixed effects panel 
model and suggesting that the base levels of the dependent variables differ. 
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A significance test on the sum of the input elasticities show that the H statistic 
lies between zero and unity in the full sample and second sub-period. By contrast, the 
H statistic in the first sub-period is not significantly different from unity. The results 
show that the null hypotheses H = 0 and H = 1 can both be rejected at the 5% 
significance level for the second sub-sample and full sample, which indicates the 
monopolistic competition. For the first sub-sample the null hypotheses H = 0 can be 
rejected at the 1% significance level, but null hypothesis H = 1 cannot be rejected at the 
10% significance level, which indicates perfect competition.  
Thus, we can conclude that the Czech banking market in monopolistic-
competitive in general. However, the disaggregated picture of competitive conditions 
shows that competition in banking decreased over the estimation period after the Czech 
Republic joined the EU in 2004. Whereas the Czech banking sector can be characterized 
as one with perfect competition in 2001–2005, the intensity of competition decreased to 
the level of monopolistic competition in 2005–2009. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of the paper was to estimate the level of competition in the Czech 
banking market during the period 2001–2009. Applying the Panzar-Rosse model we 
came to conclusion that the competitive conditions worsened over time analyzed. 
Whereas the banking market during the first sub-period 2001–2005 was found to be 
perfectly competitive, the structure of monopolistic competition was revealed during the 
second sub-period 2005–2009. More concretely, the H statistic computed for the full 
sample is 0.6240, the H statistic for the first sub-period is 0.9846, and the H statistic for 
the second sub-period 0.6368. Such a substantial worsening in competitive conditions 
after joining the EU is rather surprising.  
Therefore, to shed more light on this question we suggest conducting of separate 
analyses of competitive conditions for core banking business and non-core activities. 
Furthermore, we also suggest application of the Bresnahan-Lau model that can, due to 
its nature and data requirements, reveal some additional information on the nature of 
competition. 
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